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Plaintiffs/Appellees, George S. Diumenti II and Douglas J. 
Allred, by and through counsel of record, and pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following Brief of 
Appellees/Respondents: 
JURISDICTION AND ASSIGNMENT 
Jurisdiction is properly before the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Title 78 Chapter 2 Section 2 Utah Code; the Supreme 
Court has assigned this appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 4A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) (1953 as amended). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are raised on appeal: (1) Whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of 
fact that Brown was a party to a express bailment contract that was 
breached; (2) Whether as an express term of the bailment contract, 
Brown agreed that he would not fly the airplane until insurance on 
the aircraft was obtained. 
The simple question on appeal is whether the trial court had 
a sufficient basis for finding an express bailment contract between 
Diumenti and Brown, and whether such bailment contract included an 
express agreement to insure the aircraft before it was flown by 
Brown. Defendant attempts to argue that the trial court's finding 
that Brown was not a party to a leasing contract under Plaintiffs' 
first cause of action precludes a finding of breach under an 
express bailment contract. This position is contrary to the trial 
record, and is wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
As will be discussed below, Defendant's position that Brown 
could not be a party to a bailment contract under plaintiffs' third 
cause of action, is essentially an attack on the factual findings 
of the trial court, both at the time of the original ruling and in 
subsequent findings. Such findings "shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous" with "due regard given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Grayson 
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). The facts 
are viewed favorable to the verdict and where there is any 
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reasonable support in the evidence for the verdict, it will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 
533 P.2d 900, at 902 (Utah 1975). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Appellees concur with Appellant's statement that a resolution 
of this case involves an understanding of the law of bailments. 
However, the issues in this case can be very simply stated: Was 
there sufficient evidence to find a bailment existed, and, if so, 
did such bailment include an express undertaking or agreement by 
Brown not to fly the aircraft until insurance on the airplane was 
secured. 
Appellees' contention that a bailment contract with Brown was 
not possible because the trial court had "already determined that 
no contract ever existed between Brown and Diumenti" ignores the 
specific ruling of the trial court when it dismissed only 
plaintiffs' first cause of action against Brown based on a lease 
theory, and specifically reserved a ruling on plaintiffs' third 
cause of action in bailment to a later date. 
Appellant argues that even if a bailment contract is proven, 
Appellees may not recover against Brown because Appellee has failed 
to prove Appellant was negligent, and "negligence is the basis for 
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liability in a cause of action for bailment". However, this 
contention ignores well-settled bailment law which holds that a 
party to a bailment will be liable for his failure to abide by 
express bailment terms, such as the agreement in this case by 
defendant Brown not to fly the airplane before obtaining insurance. 
Dresser Industries v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 560 P.2d 393 (Alaska 
1977). Therefore, this Court must determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence for the trial court's finding that Brown 
specifically agreed to secure insurance covering his use of the 
airplane before flying the airplane. If so, the trial court's 
judgment against Brown should be upheld. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
The matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya in 
April 1989. Plaintiff's first cause of action in the complaint was 
dismissed as against Larry Brown at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case. Following closing argument the trial court took 
the matter under advisement. The trial court entered a memorandum 
decision the 14th day of June 1989. (Record at 109-112) Defendants 
filed a Motion To Amend Judgment or For New Trial on the 20th day 
of June 1989. (Record at 113-114). Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment against Larry Brown, prepared by 
plaintiff's counsel, were signed by the trial court and entered the 
18th day of July, 1989. (Record at 120-123). Defendants' motion 
to amend judgment or for new trial was denied by the trial court in 
a minute entry dated August 28, 1989, copies of which were mailed 
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to counsel that same date. (Record at 139) A formal order denying 
defendants' Rule 59 motion was signed July 1990. 
In July, 1990, defendant Brown initiated his first appeal in 
this case. On May 12, 1992, this Court issued an unpublished 
opinion in which it found that the trial court had erred in 
entering findings seemingly based on plaintiffs' first cause of 
action in contract, after dismissing such cause of action as 
against defendant Brown. This Court remanded the case to the trial 
court, for a specific ruling under plaintiffs' negligence and 
bailment causes of action, the second and third causes of action in 
plaintiffs' action against defendants. (See Decision in Initial 
Appeal, Exhibit "A" attached hereto). 
In September 1993, following oral argument in June 1993, the 
trial court entered a new judgment against defendant Brown, and 
made a specific finding that there existed a bailment contract 
between the parties, which provided as an express agreement, that 
"defendants would obtain insurance to cover the airplane during the 
time the airplane was in the defendants' possession. (See New 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto). 
In September, 1993, defendant Brown again appealed the trial 
court's ruling. (See Exhibit "C", attached hereto). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court: 
Judgment was granted in favor of plaintiffs against both 
defendants. 
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D. Statement of Relevant Facts: 
1. Plaintiffs were the owners of a twin engine Cessna 414 
(hereinafter referred to as the "airplane") that was involved in a 
crash at the Tooele Valley Airport, on or about May 9, 1984, 
resulting in no injuries but in substantial property damage. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 1, Record at 122; uncontroverted at 
trial). 
2. Defendant Brown was piloting the airplane at the time of 
the crash at Tooele. (Transcript at 23, uncontroverted and 
testified to by both Brown and Ritter throughout their testimony). 
3. At the time relevant to this proceeding, Defendant Brown 
had been an officer, manager of operations, chief pilot, and an 
owner of Mercury Aircourier Service and two affiliated companies 
"controlled by [defendant] Mr. Ritter and [Brown]". (Transcript at 
3-5; and 31-32). 
4. At the time of the crash, defendant Brown was not covered 
by existing insurance on the airplane, had not provided insurance 
for his use of the airplane and had taken no action to assure that 
insurance for his use of the airplane was in effect. (Original 
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 2 and 3, Record at 122). 
5. Defendant Brown was present and participated at a meeting 
wherein the lease or use of the airplane was initially discussed, 
which meeting involved Ritter, Brown, and Diumenti, and which took 
place in Ritter!s home. (Transcript at 34 to 37, also at 103; 
Diumenti transcript at 9). 
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6. Defendant Brown participated in a discussion at that first 
meeting "specifically about getting a waiver for me on his 
insurance since I didn't meet the open pilot clause" on the 
existing insurance policy. (Testimony of Brown, Transcript at 36 
lines 5-7; also Diumenti transcript at 11-12). 
7. Mr. Diumenti testified that at the first meeting the 
parties discussed in detail obtaining insurance on the airplane. 
Mr. Diumenti took a copy of the existing insurance policy on the 
airplane and reviewed it with defendants Brown and Ritter. 
Diumenti testified that the parties discussed obtaining an open 
pilot waiver to the insurance policy, and that defendants indicated 
they knew Diumenti's insurance carrier. Diumenti testified that 
Brown and Ritter indicated that "Mr. Brown would immediately, if 
the matter were consummated, get with Valline Agency to get the 
necessary waivers so that he could be added to the policy". 
(Diumenti supplemental transcript at 10-15). Finally, Diumenti 
testified that there was a specific understanding with defendants 
Ritter and Brown that they would "have their pilot added to the 
waiver column of our policy and should they be engaged in services 
or transactions that weren't covered by our policy, they would 
obtain insurance for those situations." (Diumenti Supplemental 
transcript, at 15-16). In connection with such understanding, 
Diumenti testified that it was his understanding that Brown would 
take his log to the insurer and undertake necessary activities to 
obtain insurance (Diumenti supplemental transcript, at 16). 
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8. Diumenti further testified that it was the parties 
understanding that "the individual for Mr. Ritter that would be 
flying the aircraft would be added to our policy and that any use 
beyond the use prescribed 
in the policy . . . would be a use insured by them, if it were not 
already insured in the policy". (Diumenti Transcript at 33). 
9. Diumenti testified that Brown agreed in the initial 
meeting that "he would be the only person to fly the aircraft after 
being added to the policy", and acknowledged "what he had to do to 
get his waiver on that policy . . . ". (Diumenti supplemental 
transcript at 50-51). 
10. In response to questioning by Brian Bernard, Diumenti 
testified that Brown made representations "about moving forward and 
getting insurance coverage", and that he would be the only person 
to fly the aircraft. Further, Mr. Diumenti testified that after 
the check out flight on April 30, 1984, he gave Brown the key to 
the airplane and "told [Brown] that I didn't expect that airplane 
to go anywhere until there was insurance", and Brown said he would 
contact the insurance agent the next day. (Diumenti supplemental 
transcript at 51-52). 
11. Prior to the Tooele flight and crash, Brown flew the 
airplane and did landings on a flight to Pocatello, Idaho, under 
the supervision of the owners and a pilot they had retained for 
that flight. (Brown testimony, Transcript at 15-17). 
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12. Brown inspected and viewed the plane on various other 
occasions prior to the Tooele flight, "to make sure that I knew 
where the controls were, their function, and how to operate them." 
(Brown testimony, Transcript at 18-19). 
13. Prior to the Tooele flight, Brown inquired of the 
airplane's physical condition in conversations with a Bart Hocker, 
who Brown described as "our mechanic" and who was doing some work 
on the airplane. (Brown testimony, Transcript at 39-40). 
14. In responding to questions regarding authorization from 
the airplane's owners for the work his mechanic was doing, Brown 
testified "I had no reason to doubt that there was an oral 
agreement which was enforceable." (Brown testimony, Transcript at 
225 lines 21-22). 
15. Brown testified that he had approximately 30 years of 
flying experience ("I have been flying regularly since 1954." Brown 
testimony, Transcript at 6) and that he understood the importance 
of insurance (Brown testimony, Transcript at 222) and that in their 
ordinary course of doing business they assured that their pilots 
were specifically named on their insurance policies even if they 
were covered by the open pilot clause in order to absolutely assure 
insurance coverage (Brown testimony, Transcript at 224 lines 15-
25). 
16. Ritter and Brown were acting in their individual 
capacities and not as agents of a corporation (Original Findings of 
Fact paragraph 2, Record 122, also Memorandum Decision paragraph 2, 
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Record 110). They expressly agreed to take steps to be added to 
plaintiff's insurance coverage or to provide their own coverage, 
which they failed to do (Findings of Fact paragraphs 3 and 4, 
Record at 122; Memorandum Decision paragraphs 2 and 3, Record at 
110). 
17. At the time of the accident, Brown had physical control 
of the aircraft (Transcript at 162.) 
18. In the trial, Colleen Ritter, defendant Arthur Ritterfs 
wife, testified that she was present during the meeting between 
Diumenti and defendants Brown and Ritter in the end of April, 1984 
in which the lease of plaintiffs was discussed, and that it was her 
understanding that "Mr. Diumenti was emphatic that whoever was 
going to fly the airplane be covered by Mr. Diumenti?s insurance" 
(Transcript, 203). 
19. Defendant Ritter testified that Diumenti "was really 
adamant that we have the aircraft insured under his policy . . . . " 
(Transcript at 79). 
209. Brown testified that he had never received clearance from 
Diumenti to fly the airplane. He further testified that he simply 
"inferred" that insurance was obtained for him to fly the airplane, 
and that he understood the importance of having insurance on an 
aircraft (Transcript, at 221-222). Finally, Brown testified that 
he did not ever inquire to see if he was covered to fly the 
Diumenti airplane (Transcript, at 226), and simply didn't think 
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about insurance at the time of the accident (Transcript at 227-
228). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Brown's appeal is essentially based on two 
arguments: 
First, since the trial court had determined that Brown was not 
a party to a contract under plaintiffs' first cause of action for 
breach of contract, Brown could not be held liable under a bailment 
theory - plaintiffs' third cause of action. Secondly, defendant 
argues that even if a bailment existed between plaintiffs and 
defendant Brown, the judgment against Brown must be dismissed 
because "a finding of negligence is necessary before a bailee can 
be liable for damages under a bailment", and the trial court made 
no such negligence finding. As discussed below, the first argument 
completely ignores the trial transcript at the time the first cause 
of action was dismissed, at which time plaintiffs' third cause of 
action under a bailment theory was specifically discussed and 
reserved by the trial court for a later ruling. The trial court 
later specifically found an express bailment agreement with Brown, 
in which he specifically agreed to secure insurance before flying 
the airplane. Brown's second argument ignores well-settled case 
law, which holds that the general duty of a party to a bailment 
will be modified by the express terms of such bailment. 
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Defendant Brown is incorrectly attempting to use the trial 
court's dismissal of plaintiffs' first cause of action against 
Brown as the basis for contending that the trial court found that 
"no contract ever existed between Brown and Diumenti", even a 
contract for a bailment covered by plaintiffs' third cause of 
action, which was expressly reserved by the trial court for a later 
ruling. This is an incorrect interpretation of the trial court's 
intent. Further, the trial transcript is replete with evidence 
which supports the trial court's ruling that Brown was a party to 
a bailment, and that he expressly agreed to secure insurance before 
flying the airplane. 
As plaintiffs pointed out in their brief in the initial appeal 
in this case, plaintiffs prosecuted the case on two alternative, 
but not mutually exclusive theories of contract: one was based on 
an alleged comprehensive and detailed agreement for a long term use 
of the airplane, which cause of action was set forth in plaintiffs' 
complaint as the first cause of action and which cause was also 
dismissed as against Brown at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' 
case. The other contract theory was grounded in bailment: i.e., 
that defendants had possession of an airplane the plaintiffs held 
title to, and that such possession and use was authorized (that is, 
the airplane was not stolen nor was it being used without 
authorization) pursuant to a bailment agreement among the parties, 
including Brown, that included an express undertaking by Brown that 
he would take and use the airplane only after either obtaining 
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insurance coverage or assuring that he was covered pursuant to 
plaintiffs' insurance policy. 
The evidence was uncontroverted that (1) Brown took possession 
of and was flying the airplane; (2) that Brown had not assured or 
verified that he was covered by insurance while flying the 
aircraft; (3) that the airplane was uninsured and crashed while 
Brown was operating it; and (4) that plaintiffs incurred damages in 
the sum of $33,133.86 as a result. The testimony conflicted, 
however, on the issue of whose obligation it was to assure that 
Brown was covered by insurance prior to Brown's flying the 
airplane, plaintiffs pointing the finger, so to speak, at the 
defendants, and the defendants vice versa. The trial court was in 
the best position to judge the weight and credibility of the 
witnesses' testimony, and the trial court found that Brown had 
indeed agreed to assure insurance coverage prior to taking and 
using the airplane, and that his failure to do so was a breach of 
the agreement. 
After this case was remanded, the trial court entered specific 
findings that a bailment contract between Diumenti and Brown 
existed, and that such bailment included a specific agreement to 
secure insurance before flying the airplane. (See Exhibit "B"). 
As indicated, the general rule that a bailee is only responsible 
for losses result from his negligence will be modified if the 
bailee expressly agrees to undertake a more specific duty. C.J.M. 
Construction, Inc. v. Chandler Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 708 P.2d 
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60 (Alaska 1985). This specific finding by the trial court removes 
any doubt as to the basis for the trial court's earlier ruling 
against defendant Brown, and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Consequently, it is unnecessary for this Court to find that 
defendants were negligent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND BROWN LIABLE 
UNDER A BAILMENT CONTRACT 
In the trial court's most recent findings of fact, it found 
that (1) In connection with the delivery of possession and control 
of the airplane to defendants, defendants agreed to obtain 
insurance on the aircraft; (2) the evidence supports a finding that 
possession and control of the airplane was delivered to defendants 
under a bailment arrangement, and that defendants were bailees 
under such arrangement; and (3) the evidence further supports a 
finding that, under the bailment, there was an express agreement 
between the parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover 
the airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants' 
possession. (See Exhibit "B"). The trial transcript contains 
abundant support for plaintiffs' position, concurred in by the 
trial court, that Brown was a party to an oral bailment with 
Diumenti attendant Brown's use of the airplane which specifically 
included an agreement to assure insurance coverage by either taking 
the steps necessary to be covered by plaintiffs' policy or to 
obtain their own coverage. Very simply, defendant Brown breached 
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that agreement by failing to provide insurance, as a result of 
which the plaintiffs were damaged in the sum of $33,133.86. 
Defendant argues that it cannot be held liable under a 
bailment theory because the trial "already determined that no 
contract existed between Diumenti and Brown". However, this 
argument completely ignores the specific discussion at the time of 
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' first cause of action, 
in which it was clearly acknowledged that plaintiffs' cause of 
action in bailment would be preserved. The court record reads, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
Mr. Barnard: We would move for dismissal of various 
portions of the claim --of Mr. Lindsley's causes of 
action. First, as to the contractual cause of action, it 
names both Ritter and Brown as defendants. Mr. 
Diumentifs testimony today was clear. It was clear he 
was entering into an agreement with Ritter. He makes no 
claim at all that there was a contractual agreement with 
Brown. We would move to dismiss that first cause of 
action and contract against Brown. 
The Court: By Mr. Diumentifs own admission, unless 
you claim an implied contract — 
Mr. Lindsley: Well, that's part of the reason why 
we included Mr. Brown in this was the -- I think Mr. 
Diumenti's testimony was unequivocal that his agreement 
specifically was with Ritter. However, I think there was 
[an] collateral agreement with Mr. Brown that the plane 
wouldn't be flown unless he had -- that he would not fly 
the airplane unless he made -- found the appropriate 
rider from the insurance company. 
The Court: That doesn't square with your pleadings. 
You would have to -- you would want to amend your plead-
ings to conform with the evidence. You are claiming 
there was an agreement entered May 8 with both these 
parties that they would provide insurance coverage for 
any losses occasioned to that aircraft Cessna 414. 
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Mr. Lindsley: The third cause of action addresses 
bailment. 
The Court: That's a different cause of action. 
He's addressing count I which is based solely on 
contract. 
Mr. Lindsley: Right, except to the extent that 
bailment is a particular kind of contract. 
The Court: Oh, yes, we are not addressing that yet. 
I suppose we will come to that. 
Mr. Lindsley: If we are not addressing that then 1 
would agree. 
(emphasis added). (Transcript at 73-74). 
Thus, it becomes apparent from a reading of the trial 
transcript that in its ruling, the trial court intended to dismiss 
only plaintiffs' first cause of action in breach of contract (which 
cause of action alleged a detailed lease arrangement), and 
expressly recognized that plaintiffs' third cause of action, also 
a contract claim in bailment, was being preserved. It is also 
evident from a simple reading of the transcript that all parties 
surely understood that plaintiffs intended to continue to assert a 
claim under their bailment cause of action, including a claim that 
Brown specifically undertook to obtain insurance before flying the 
airplane. In view of this portion of the trial transcript, 
defendant Brown cannot claim in good faith, as it did with respect 
to plaintiffs' first cause of action, that he relied on the court's 
dismissal in failing to present evidence on the bailment issue, as 
it is clear from the trial court's statements that it intended to 
allow plaintiffs to proceed under this cause of action against 
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Brown. Further, it is clear from the record that Brown did, 
indeed, present evidence regarding plaintiffs' bailment claim. 
(See Transcript, at 206-209, in which defendant Brown's counsel 
asks detailed questions of Brown regarding insurance on airplane, 
discussions between parties, and control and possession of 
airplane). In contrast, plaintiffs would be significantly 
prejudiced if this Court were to rule that the trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' first cause of action resulted in a denial 
of his claim in bailment, when it is clear from the trial court's 
ruling that the bailment claim would be reserved for a later 
ruling. 
As plaintiffs discussed in their brief in the initial appeal, 
plaintiffs' first cause of action was based on a specific, 
comprehensive leasing agreement that Diumenti alleged and testified 
to, which agreement allegedly included particular terms for 
compensation and other details. 
Both defendants denied that such an agreement was ever entered 
into or consummated, and testified that the course of dealings 
between the parties was one as Brown describes "to explore the 
possibility of using" the airplane (Brown testimony, Transcript at 
34), including taking the airplane to Tooele for refueling and then 
on to Logan for the purpose "of checking it out and weighing it" 
(Brown testimony, Transcript at 40-41), attendant their "looking at 
the possibility of doing commuter work ... between Logan and Salt 
Lake." (Brown testimony, Transcript at 30) Brown also acknowledged 
17 
the following: that he was present at the first meeting to discuss 
leasing or using the airplane (Brown testimony, Transcript at 34-
37); that insurance coverage for his piloting of the airplane was 
specifically a matter discussed at that meeting (Brown testimony, 
Transcript at 36, lines 5-7; also see Diumenti transcript at 11-
12); that he took a test flight in the airplane, familiarized 
himself with the controls on multiple occasions, inquired of the 
airplane's physical condition with Bart Hocker who he described as 
"our mechanic," and as intended was the pilot when he and Ritter 
took actual possession of and flew the plane on the day of the 
crash. 
Plaintiffs1 third cause of action was also one in contract, 
based on theories arising from bailment, i.e. actual possession and 
use of the airplane. Bailments come in sundry forms, and include 
leases, rentals, loans, and storage, and as defined in 8 Am Jur 2d 
798 Bailments Section 2, "A "bailment," in its ordinary legal 
signification, imports the delivery of personal property by one 
person to another in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, 
express or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully executed, 
and the property returned or duly accounted for when the special 
purpose is accomplished, or kept until the bailor reclaims it". 
The essence of bailment is title in one party and possession with 
another. Black's defines bailment: 
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A delivery of goods or personal property, by one person 
to another, in trust for the execution of a special 
object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial 
either to the bailor or bailee or both, and upon a 
contract, express or implied, to perform the trust and 
carry out such object, and thereupon either to redeliver 
the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose of the same 
in conformity with the purpose of the trust. 
There is no question that Brown had taken possession and was 
exercising control over the airplane. He obtained the keys and was 
flying the plane. There is no question that this use was attendant 
a course of discussions that included Brown specifically. While 
the trial court found that there was not a specific leasing 
agreement as alleged in plaintiffs1 first cause of action, there 
was obviously some kind of arrangement or agreement relating to the 
possession of the airplane, because Brown and Ritter had taken over 
control and possession of the airplane, their mechanic was doing 
work on the airplane and they were flying it to check it out 
attendant their "possibility of doing commuter work." 
The existence of possession and control and the intentions of 
the parties with respect to the property involved in a bailment are 
factual questions, and an appellate court should not set aside a 
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or it reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302 
(Utah App. 1992). There is more than ample evidence in this case 
to support a finding that a bailment existed between Diumenti and 
Brown and Ritter. 
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The only real issue that was before the trial court was 
whether the terms of the bailment agreement pursuant to which Brown 
had taken possession of and was using the airplane included an 
agreement to assure that he was covered by insurance while flying 
the craft. The trial court, both at the time of its original 
ruling, and again more specifically in its ruling after this case 
was remanded (See Exhibit "B"), weighed the testimony of the 
parties and made a finding of fact that the agreement did include 
such a provision and that Brown and Ritter had breached that 
specific agreement. That finding was well supported by Diumentifs 
testimony that defendants had agreed to contact the insurance 
carrier and make arrangements to add Brown to the existing policy 
or, alternatively, obtain alternative coverage, and that Diumenti 
told Brown he would not fly the aircraft until coverage were 
obtained, to which Brown agreed (Diumenti transcript at 16, lines 
21-24; page 33, lines 15-21; page 50, line 16 through 51, line 24). 
That finding is further supported by Brown's acknowledgement that 
there was a specific conversation regarding the matter of getting 
"a waiver for me on his insurance since I didn't meet the open 
pilot clause" on the existing insurance policy (Testimony of Brown, 
Transcript at 36 lines 5-7; also Diumenti transcript at 11-12), 
that he understood the importance of insurance (Brown testimony, 
Transcript at 222) and that in Brown's ordinary course of doing 
business they assured that their pilots were specifically named on 
their insurance policies even if they were covered by the open 
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pilot clause in order to absolutely assure insurance coverage 
(Brown testimony, Transcript at 224 lines 15-25). 
Additionally, Brown acknowledged that although he had been 
flying regularly since 1954, he primarily utilized aircraft he did 
not own, and usually leased or rented or borrowed airplanes (Brown 
testimony, Transcript at 11, and 24), including in his commercial 
enterprises. Frequently the leases were "per use." (Brown 
testimony, Transcript at 24, line 8). This testimony, in 
conjunction with his testimony acknowledging the importance of 
assuring insurance coverage for individual pilots, constitutes more 
than sufficient basis for the trial court to find that this 
occasion and "use" of the plaintiffs' airplane was per an express 
bailment agreement (i.e. not stolen or otherwise unauthorized) 
which included an agreement to not use the airplane without 
assurance of insurance coverage. 
The standard of review here is well established. The facts 
are viewed favorable to the verdict and where there is any 
reasonable support in the evidence for the verdict, it will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel. 
533 P.2d 900, at 902 (Utah 1975) Factual findings of the trial 
court "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous" with "due 
regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
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The trial court correctly ascertained that (1) Brown had taken 
possession of and was using the airplane (2) pursuant to an express 
bailment agreement that included the promise that insurance would 
be verified or otherwise obtained prior to such use. Brown 
challenges neither the finding that such insurance was not obtained 
or provided, nor the finding of damages as awarded by the trial 
court arising out of that failure. The trial court's ruling and 
judgment should accordingly be upheld. 
POINT II: DEFENDANT BROWN IS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS DUE TO 
HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HIS AGREEMENT NOT TO FLY THE 
AIRPLANE WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING INSURANCE COVERAGE 
Defendant Brown argues incorrectly that, even if a bailment 
with Brown existed, Brown cannot be liable because either (a) the 
bailment contract was implied and did not include any provisions 
regarding insurance, or (b) plaintiffs must, in any event, show 
that defendant Brown was negligent. The first argument completely 
ignores the trial court's specific findings, Exhibit "B", that as 
part of the bailment contract, there was an express agreement by 
the defendants to assure there was insurance to cover the airplane 
while it was in defendants' possession. As indicated above, this 
finding is well supported by the trial testimony of Diumenti, Brown 
and others. 
Defendant's second argument that Brown could not be held 
liable under a bailment theory in the absence of a showing of 
negligence, ignores not only the trial court's finding of an 
express undertaking with respect to insurance, but well-settled 
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law. As noted in 8 Am. Jur.2d, Bailments, Section 54, a bailment 
contract is governed by the same rules of law that govern other 
contracts. Similarly, the specific terms of a bailment contract, 
express or implied, determine the rights, duties and liabilities of 
the parties to each other. See Miller v. Bank of Holly Springs, 95 
So. 129 (Miss 1923), and 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments, Section 133. 
It is well-settled that an express agreement between the 
bailor and bailee will modify, consistent with general contract 
principles, the general rule that a bailee is liable for loss to 
bailed goods only if he is shown to be negligent. Dresser 
Industries, Inc. v. Foss Launch and Tug Co.. 560 P.2d 393 (Alaska 
1977); C.J.M. Construction. Inc. v. Chandler Plumbing & Heating. 
708 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1985). Similarly, the parties to a bailment 
agreement can provide that one party is responsible for carrying or 
obtaining insurance for the benefit of both, and in such case, the 
party who takes on responsibility will be liable for the entire 
loss. Dresser, 560 P.2d at 395. That is precisely the situation 
in the instant case, in which the trial court found that defendants 
Brown and Ritter had expressly undertaken to obtain insurance on 
the airplane. 
While in the absence of a special agreement the obligations of 
parties to a bailment contract will be fixed by law, the parties to 
a bailment may make their own express contracts with respect to 
their respective obligations and liabilities, for the purpose of 
enlarging, abridging or modifying the bailment which is implied by 
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law, Allen v. Southern Pac. Co,, 213 P. 2d 667 (Utah 1950); 
Thompson Lumber Co. v. Cozier Container Corp., 333 P.2d 1004 (Idaho 
1959). See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments, Sections 132-136, 139. 
Thus, while it is true, as defendant Brown contends, that bailees 
are not ordinarily responsible for damages not attributable to 
their fault, that common law rule may be altered by an express 
contract. Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales and Service, 828 P.2d 162 
(Alaska 1992). 
It is undisputed, as indicated above, that the parties to a 
bailment can provide by express terms that one party is responsible 
for procuring full insurance for the benefit of both. Michigan 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. National Surety Corp., 156 F.2d 329 (8th 
Cir. 1946); Texas Van Lines, Inc. v. Godfrey, 313 S.W. 2d 922 
(Texas 1958); Dresser, 560 P.2d at 395; See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Bailments, Section 146. 
The trial court had more than sufficient evidence to enter a 
finding that as part of the bailment agreement, defendant Brown 
(and Ritter) agreed that the airplane would not be flown by them 
until Brown was included on the existing policy, or alternative 
coverage was obtained. The trial court further found that such 
express agreement was assented to by the Brown. See Allen v. 
Southern Pac. Co, 213 P.2d at 668. Such an express bailment 
arrangement is enforceable under general contract principles, which 
would hold defendant Brown liable for the loss resulting from his 
failure to comply with such bailment terms. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court found that Brown used plaintiffs' airplane and 
had possession and control of such airplane. Brown's use was 
authorized; that authorization included an agreement that he 
wouldn't use the airplane unless and until he had verified or 
secured insurance coverage. He hadn't secured or verified or 
assured insurance coverage for his use of the airplane, and he 
subsequently destroyed the airplane in a crash. The plaintiffs 
suffered damages, as a result, in the sum of $33,183.86. The trial 
court appropriately, fairly, and in accordance with specific 
findings that an express bailment contract existed, entered 
judgment in plaintiffs' favor and against Brown. That judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this &*- I day of June, 1994. 
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GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant Larry E. Brown appeals the trial court's ruling 
that he breached an oral agreement to obtain insurance to protect 
against damage to plaintiffs' airplane, which was leased to 
Arthur J. Ritter and Brown. 
The trial court found that in 1984, Ritter and Brown leased 
plaintiffs' airplane. The court also found that the parties 
orally agreed that Brown and Ritter would use the airplane only 
after they had been added to plaintiffs' insurance or after they 
had obtained their own insurance. Pursuant to this agreement, 
the parties understood that the insurance would cover the use of 
the airplane by Ritter and Brown. The court further found that 
Ritter and Brown failed to obtain the requisite insurance. 
On May 9, 1984, the airplane, while in the possession of 
Ritter and Brown, was damaged during a landing at the Tooele 
Valley Airport. When the accident occurred, neither Brown nor 
Ritter were covered by plaintiffs' existing insurance policy on 
the airplane, nor had they obtained insurance covering their 
operation of the airplane. 
Plaintiffs sued Ritter and Brown claiming (1) breach of 
contract; (2) negligence; and (3) bailment. The case was tried 
in April 1989. After plaintiffs' case in chief, Brown moved to 
dismiss plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, which motion was 
granted. The court took the matter under advisement after the 
trial. 
The court issued a memorandum decision on June 14, 1989, 
adjudicating defendants liable, jointly and severally, to 
plaintiffs based on a contractual theory. On July 18, 1989, the 
court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment. The court ruled that defendants' liability was based 
solely on a breach of contract by failing to obtain insurance to 
cover damage to the airplane. The court did not refer to 
plaintiffs' negligence or bailment causes of action in its 
memorandum decision, findings, or conclusions. 
Brown argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment 
against him on a contractual theory. We do not defer to the 
court's legal conclusion concerning the imposition of liability 
for breach of contract, but review it for correctness. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Brown claims that the court misled him by dismissing the 
first cause of action alleging a contract between the parties and 
subsequently imposing liability based on breach of contract. 
Thus, he contends the court deprived him of the opportunity to 
defend against the breach of contract claim in his case in chief. 
In contrast, plaintiffs argue that their bailment cause of action 
also sounded in contract, and that the court based its ruling on 
the bailment cause of action rather than on the breach of 
contract claim, which was previously dismissed. Plaintiffs' 
argument is without merit. We recognize that the "relation 
[between] bailor and bailee is created in contract." Potomac 
Ins. Co. v. Nickson. 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, 448 (1924); see 
also Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 
685 (1943) ("the entire duty of the bailee with respect to the 
bailed chattel is based on the bailment contract").1 The court, 
however, did not refer to bailment in its memorandum decision, 
1. A bailment is created when a party's personal property is 
delivered to another "in trust for a specific purpose, with an 
express or implied contract that the property will be returned or 
accounted for when the specific purpose has been accomplished or 
when the bailor reclaims the property." Christensen v. Hoover, 
643 P.2d 525, 528-29 (Colo. 1982). 
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findings, or conclusions. Moreover, the court did not make any 
findings or conclusions concerning negligence, which-is the basis 
for liability in a cause of action for bailment. Sumsionr 132 
P.2d at 685-86; see also Barlow Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel, 
533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975) (a "bailee has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care and caution commensurate with acceptance of the 
responsibility of safekeeping the property of others entrusted to 
him"). 
Therefore, we conclude that the court erred when, after 
dismissing the first cause of action for breach of contract, it 
concluded that Brown was liable to plaintiffs for breach of 
contract. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)r the 
dismissal * "operates as an adjudication on the merits" of the 
breach of contract claim.2 In reliance on the court'sr dismissal, 
Brown did not present evidence in defense of the breach of 
contract claim. Because Brown was prejudiced3 by the dismissal 
and subsequent .ruling based on breach -of contract, we reverse the 
trial courts judgment and remand for a determination- of the 
2. Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
relevant part: 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
for in this rule . . . operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
3. Cf. Radlev v. Smith. 6 Utah 314, 313 P.2d 465, 467 (1957) 
("[a] party who is advised of the issues and given full and fair 
opportunity to meet them is in no position to claim surprise or 
error as to the issues litigated"); National Farmers Union 
Property and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 
253 (1955) ("if an issue is to be tried and a party's rights 
concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and 
an opportunity to meet it"); Morris v. Russell. 120 Utah 545, 236 
P.2d 451, 455 (1951) (court did not err in reinstating previously 
dismissed count because "[t]here is no showing that the 
defendants were misled or prevented from presenting all their 
evidence or in amy way prejudiced by reinstating the count") . 
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negligence and bailment claims on which the court did not rule. 
Inasmupir^Ss^the parties hav^ presented all. their evidence, we see 
no n££d for k new ta/Lal., 
Regnal W. Garff, Judga/"^ 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, flludge 
Gregory/^. Orme, Judge 
James C. Lewis #1943 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and, 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR, 
J.RnTER 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C86-3354 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
On June 8, 1993, defendant's Motion to Amend Findings came on for oral argument, with 
James C. Lewis appearing for plaintiffs, and Brian Bamard appearing for defendant. The matter 
was fully argued and submitted. Based upon the pleadings submitted in this matter, and oral 
argument, the Court finds as follows: 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1984, plaintiffs delivered to defendants sole possession and control of a twin 
engine Cessna 414 (the "airplane"). 
2. After taking sole possession and control of the airplane, defendant made use of the 
airplane. 
3. Defendant Brown was present and participated at a meeting wherein the lease or 
use of the aircraft was discussed. In addition, at such meeting, 'the parties, and defendant Brown 
discussed specifically obtaining insurance on the plane. 
4. On or about May 9, 1984, while defendant Brown was piloting the plane, the 
airplane crashed at the Tooele Valley Airport, resulting in substantial property damage in the sum 
of $33,133.86. 
5. Prior to the airplane crash, defendant Brown flew the plane, did landings on a 
flight to Pocatello, Idaho, under the supervision of the owners and a pilot they had retained for 
that flight. Defendant Brown inspected and viewed the plane on various other occasions prior 
to the airplane crash to make sure that he knew where the controls were, their functions and how 
operate them. 
6. Prior to the airplane crash, Brown inquired of the airplane's physical condition in 
conversations with Bart Harker, the individual who Brown described as "our mechanic and who 
was doing some work on the airplane. 
7. In connection with the delivery of possession and control of the airplane to 
defendants, defendants agreed to obtain insurance on the aircraft. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The evidence before the Court supports a finding that possession and control of the 
airplane was delivered to defendants under a bailment arrangement, and that defendants were 
bailees under such arrangement. 
8. The evidence further supports a finding that, under the bailment, there was an 
express agreement between the parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the 
airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants possession. 
9. During the time the airplane was in defendant's possession, defendants, as bailees, 
had sole possession and right to control the airplane. 
10. As a result of defendants failure to obtain insurance, plaintiffs were damaged in 
the sum of $33,133.86. 
11. That defendants, as bailees of the airplane, were responsible for any damages 
caused to the aircraft as a result of their failure to obtain insurance as agreed. 
12. That plaintiffs* are entitled to a judgment against defendant Brown for the sum of 
$33,133.86, together with interest thereon from December, 1986. 
Dated this day of July, 1993. 
James S. Sawaya 
District Judge 
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: Civil No. C-86-3354 
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DEFENDANT LARRY H. BROWN hereby gives notice of his 
appeal of that judgment entered against him in the above 
matter as a result of the hearing in this matter on June 8, 
1993, represented by a Minute Entry of June 17, 1993 and 
embodied in an Order and Judgment served upon defendant's 
counsel on August 30, 1993. 
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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